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In his fictional recreation of the People’s Temple massacre, Jonestown, Harris presents us 
with a protagonist who counter-actualizes the trauma that wounds him, living creatively out 
of the event and constructing an alternative present-future. Drawing on Deleuzian philosophy, 
this essay argues for a re-conceptualization of Jonestown in terms that evoke not only 
Deleuze’s philosophy of time and immanence but also his distinction, via Nietzsche, between 
active and reactive forces. By means of a character (Francisco Bone) who embraces the power 
of transformation, creation and difference-in-itself, Harris demonstrates the value of active 
forces that do not depend on external recognition or dialectical negation in order to be for a 
postcolonial philosophy of the imagination. 
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From Palace of the Peacock (1960) to The Ghost of Memory (2006), Wilson Harris 
has displayed a commitment to a vitalist sense of immanent creativity within the 
context of diverse histories of conquest and exploitation. Resonant with the work of 
fellow Caribbean author-philosopher, Édouard Glissant, Harris’s sense of a diverse, 
creolizing and, importantly, always-incomplete and non-absolute totality or wholeness 
reflects a concurrent shift in contemporary European philosophy from transcendence 
to immanence as the basis of ontology.1 Indeed, the interest in a non-linear concept of 
time, the transformative capacity of the past, difference and a radical sense of the new 
characterize the postcolonial projects of both Glissant and Harris as much as the 
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philosophy of one of the key figures in the “post-continental” turn to immanence, 
Gilles Deleuze (cf. Burns). This essay is concerned with Harris’s own philosophy of 
immanence and time developed through his fictional and theoretical writings, in 
particular, the novel Jonestown (1996). In his imaginative recreation of the Jonestown 
tragedy in which over 900 members of the People’s Temple died on the 18 November 
1978, Harris exposes the recreative potential of the past: the challenge to create a new 
future while bearing forth the scars of the wounding event. And it is precisely the 
regenerative capacity of the event that marks Harris as a profoundly postcolonial 
writer and thinker. As Edward Said argued in Culture and Imperialism:  
 
Many of the most interesting post-colonial writers bear their past within them 
– as scars of humiliating wounds, as instigation for different practices, as 
potentially revised visions of the past tending towards a new future, as 
urgently reinterpretable and redeployable experiences, in which the formerly 
silent native speaks and acts on territory taken back from the empire. (34–5; 
emphasis added) 
 
The question of how one responds to or lives with such “humiliating wounds” lies at 
the heart of Jonestown and, in turn, remains a distinctive feature of postcolonial 
philosophy, as distinguished from the reactive forces of counter-colonial opposition. 
For Harris, as for Said and, indeed, Deleuze, the potential of “a new future” is born of 
a different relation to the past traumas that wound us. 
While Harris’s interest in cross-culturalism and fractured selves has appealed 
to his critics, the vital question of his sense of “immanence” has received scant 
attention. Both Mary-Lou Emery and Hena Maes-Jelinek, for example, refer to 
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transcendence and immanence in Harris, but consider only briefly the contentious 
question of the relationship between the two. As Maes-Jelinek argues, Harris’s sense 
of the unconscious, abyss, and archetypes refer to: 
 
[an] inner transcendence, a “transcendence within immanence” [Levinas], as 
opposed to a transcendence external to man and beyond his normal 
experience. But again, this descent would itself be in search of an infinite 
absolute were it not counterpointed by the emergence of the plural otherness 
[ … ] thereby transcending the limits of the individual self. (6) 
 
To this, Emery adds that in Harris one finds a “dialectic of transcendence and 
immanence whereby the transcendent is known through the immanent” and, as such, 
“any hierarchy of being that would elevate the transcendent” is undone (69). It is clear 
from both accounts that Harris resists any a priori and absolute notion of the 
transcendent in favour of an immanent diversity-in-unity. However, Maes-Jelinek’s 
approach to transcendence is predicated on the role of the individual or inner self, 
which is always already rendered a fallacy by Harris’s sense of multiplicity or “plural 
otherness”. Understanding precisely how Harris envisions the relation between 
immanence and transcendence is key to understanding the philosophical strength of 
vision that his work articulates. As James Williams argues with respect to the 
philosopher Alfred Whitehead, Whitehead’s work details “the dance of transcendence 
and immanence” (95) insofar as he offers us a relational rather than absolute model of 
transcendence and immanence conceived of as a “becoming of different kinds and 
with different, but complementary, processes” (97). In other words, Whitehead’s 
philosophy seeks to address the crucial problem of the status of actual, seemingly 
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coherent identities or states of affairs within immanence. While the departure from a 
fixed, static and absolute concept of being (transcendence) is necessary, immanence 
understood as pure difference, “an entirely fluid world” (Whitehead qtd in Williams 
97), can become equally problematic if it offers no ground for conceptualizing real 
change or newness. By characterizing Harris’s work as caught between immanence 
and transcendence, promoting a sense of immanence that is always, impossibly, 
articulated through the individual or inner self, Maes-Jelinek touches upon but fails to 
fully recognize the complexity of the contentious philosophical demand to explain the 
production of the actual or finite within infinite immanence. If transcendence is really 
only evoked by Harris to designate, recalling Whitehead, a process by which the 
seemingly-coherent individual is “transcended” into an immanent totality, then we are 
still left with the question of how such non-absolute “fixities” (the individual, the self) 
emerge in the first place. We will need to take Maes-Jelinek’s argument much further 
to better understand Harris’s philosophical vision of immanence and transcendence. 
More problematic, I believe, is Emery’s reference to the dialectical movement 
of Harris’s fiction. Later in her essay, Emery conflates immanence with the material 
world, and posits the transcendent as the revelation of an inner insight that is always 
already present (Emery 74). As such, she adopts a distinctly Hegelian approach to 
Harris’s work, viewing dialectical process as the unfolding of a pre-given unity or 
final synthesis. This, Simone Bignall argues in her recent analysis of the problem of 
Hegelian thought in postcolonial theory, leaves us in a situation in which “reality is 
not ‘created’ but ‘realised’ [ ... ] in the sense that everything that comes to be always 
already exists, or is pre-given, and is simply ‘made real’” (34). Harris’s sense of the 
necessity to create the “genuinely new” (Jonestown 6), therefore, is undermined by 
this dialectical “unfolding”. As Deleuze argues in Difference and Repetition, “genuine 
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creation” cannot “result from any limitation of a pre-existing possibility” (264). 
Accordingly, Harris’s own sense of the urgent need to create new futures in the face 
of totalitarian and violent pasts is undermined by the imposition of a dialectical 
framework.  
In my view, both Emery and Maes-Jelinek are right to insist on a parallelism 
of the material, actual world of concrete individuations and actual selves, and a 
“transcendent” realm of ungraspable otherness in Harris. However, to present this as 
two sides of a dialectical transformation is to misunderstand the radical sense of 
newness in Harris’s work. Hegel may indeed offer us an immanent process (the 
dialectic) that accounts for evolution and change, but it remains a process directed 
towards a pre-given final synthesis. As such, Deleuze would argue, Hegel falls into 
the trap of Platonism which offered a transcendence “situated within the field of 
immanence itself” (Deleuze, Essays 137; emphasis original): a pre-determined ideal 
against which all that comes to be may be measured and judged. The absolute and the 
a priori are antithetical to Harris’s sense of creativity, immanence and diversity: the 
absolute “irons out, smoothes out, erases all differences in favour of a universal 
formula. Everything would be flattened out presumably in the simplicity of a 
triumphant code” (Harris, Essays 64). This erasure of difference, Bignall argues, 
points precisely to the problem with Hegelian dialectics when applied to postcolonial 
thought: oriented towards final synthesis, dialectical process is “aimed at the 
management of difference” (Bignall 18) and, thus, when applied in postcolonial 
thinking, “proposes solutions to colonialism that are unable to break free from a 
fundamentally imperial outlook and attitude” (20).  
By contrast, with Deleuze one finds a philosophy of becoming and change 
committed to the proliferation (or eternal return) of difference. The philosophy of 
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immanence developed by Deleuze eschews Platonic and Hegelian transcendence-
within-immanence and instead offers a transcendental empiricism. Not to be 
misunderstood as a return to transcendence (Colebrook 71), transcendental 
empiricism explores the processes by which actual states of affairs come to be what 
they are. Recalling Whitehead’s caution against a formless, chaotic immanence, 
Deleuze characterizes transcendental empiricism as a philosophy rooted in the 
material world and concerned with the ways in which specific states of affairs take 
shape within immanence. Importantly, however, it points towards a model of being 
that escapes the trappings of final synthesis. As Deleuze argues in The Logic of Sense, 
the immanent cause of actual identities or state of affairs is the virtual (118): a plane 
of absolute difference which acts as the transcendental condition of all actual things. 
By positing an actual-virtual dualism at the heart of philosophy, Deleuze should not 
be misread as returning to the “Cartesian dualism” that Harris dismisses (Harris 
Essays 185). Rather, Deleuze follows that great opponent of Descartes, Baruch 
Spinoza, and posits the actual and the virtual as the two sides of a single, immanent 
whole. As a plane of pure difference, the actualization of the virtual designates the 
production of the new; an always-renewed potential or eternal return, given the 
constitution of the virtual as difference.  
Individuation within immanence occurs in two moments: first, a plane of 
consistency is “differentiated” within the virtual; secondly, an actual form is 
“differenciated” as the becoming-actual of the virtual content. What I want to 
emphasize here is the characterization of different/ciation as an immanent process by 
which the virtual, the transcendental (but not transcendent) condition of the actual, 
both fuels the production of newness and eternally preserves difference. The aim of 
postcolonial thought freed from the dialectical logic of imperialism therefore is 
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twofold: “the disruption and ‘counter-actualisation’ of the problematic post-colonial 
present that remains tied to the virtual conditions of the emergence of colonisation, 
and the subsequent reconstruction of an alternative postcolonial present” (Bignall 
114). In turn, Said’s claim that from the “scars of humiliating wounds” of the colonial 
past “a new future” can emerge (34–35), may be reconceived as a counter-
actualization of the scars of history: a return to the injustices of the imperial past in 
order to reconstruct an alternative, genuinely postcolonial present-future.  
 While Harris does at times employ the term “dialectical”, in my view, his 
work is best understood in light of a philosophical concept of immanence and 
Deleuzian/Spinozist dualism (cf. Burns). As Emery and Maes-Jelinek recognize, 
consistent throughout his oeuvre is a rejection of absolutes, final or transcendent 
causes and a priori concepts. For Harris, a strictly dialectical method by which the 
contrasting of opposites resolves itself in the realization of an always present totality 
points towards “our misunderstanding of evolution. Evolution in its innermost 
unfathomable coherence within parallel universes is intangible. It serves hidden texts 
that we can never absolutely translate” (Jonestown 139). The intangible, vitalisitic 
force of evolution resonates more closely with Deleuze’s sense of different/ciation as 
the always-renewed production of difference than with dialectical progression 
towards a pre-determined absolute. And in the face of oppositional and “adversarial 
cultures” (Harris, Essays 58) which make us “the prisoner of inflexible sovereignty [ 
... ] sovereign ego” (59), he proposes a “cross-cultural body of civilization” (58): “If 
one polarizes the world dreadfully, the oppressor and the oppressed, then one is no 
longer in a position to understand who the oppressor is, how he relates to one, who the 
oppressed are, how the oppressed relate to one” (85). The immanent unity of the 
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whole (actual-virtual) demands an understanding of ourselves as partial, sharing in 
elements of extremity, such as good and evil, self and other. 
 In Jonestown, the connection between imperialism and “the management of 
difference” comes to the fore in the novel’s account of the utopian ambitions of Jonah 
Jones, Harris’s fictional recreation of Jim Jones, leader of the People’s Temple and 
instigator of the mass suicide that took place in Guyana in 1978. Jones first appears to 
the reader outside the Church of Eternity in a scene of death and violence, wearing 
“an air of triumph like a general’s on the field of battle” (Harris, Jonestown 13). 
Jones, Francisco Bone (the novel’s narrator) and Deacon each share the burden of 
responsibility with respect to the tragedy insofar as they are presented as the three 
founding figures of the cult: Jones the authoritarian figurehead, Bone “his left-hand 
man” and Deacon “his right-hand angel” (16). A number of references in the novel 
draw a parallel between Deacon and Lucifer, the fallen angel: “No one fathoms 
Deacon’s ancestry. He fell from the stars as an infant child. War in heaven, rebellions 
in heaven, it is said” (47). However, this is a Miltonian Lucifer, and Harris contrasts 
his act of rebellion against “the tyranny of heaven” (Milton 21) with Jones’s “perverse 
longing for glory” (Harris, Jonestown 52). While both characters share a common 
“[a]nger at injustices everywhere”, Harris draws attention to the danger that such 
sentiments “could turn nasty and become an involuntary ape of imperial hubris” (50): 
 
Jones – in the Mask of the Whale into which he descended at times – raged at 
the prejudices, the biases, the hypocrisy, that were visible everywhere. His 
anger therefore appealed to us. But it left me with a bitter taste in my mouth. 
I did not like the way he savoured anger as if it were the sweetest dish in the 
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restaurants of San Francisco. Anger became the seed of his charismatic 
pursuit of eternity, eternity’s closure of time. (49–50; emphasis original) 
 
The anger that Jones harbours fuels his will-to-dominate; by contrast, Bone and 
Deacon evoke the transformative capacity of the Carib bone-flute (alluded to by the 
protagonist’s name and his discussion of the Carib’s “ritual morsel” [16]) and 
embrace the power of creation, or will-to-power. 
Harris notes the philosophical resonances of the bone-flute in his essays, 
where the instrument is refigured as a bridge between self and other. While the 
Carib’s ritual cannibalism is a sign of a will-to-dominate, Harris rereads the bone-
flute which was carved from the body of the vanquished enemy as the transferral of 
spirit; transcending the binary division of life and death: “The bone-flute was a 
confessional organ involved in, yet subtly repudiating, the evil bias of conquest that 
afflicted humanity. It sought to invoke an apparition of re-birth clothed in colour and 
music. [... A] re-birth into unknown futures to be ceaselessly created” (Harris, Essays 
106). By incorporating the spirit and knowledge of the enemy, the bone-flute suggests 
the way in which appearances taken “as absolute or total” (106) may be revealed as 
partial. More crucially, however, it signals a process of incorporation and 
transformation: the adversarial impulse to dominate is overcome and the relation 
between self and other, life and death, becomes the ground of re-creative 
transformation and gateway to “unknown futures”. And it is in this capacity that Bone 
evokes Carib ritual in Jonestown. As Jones, Deacon and Bone sit together eating 
dinner the night before the tragedy, Bone discusses the rituals of the Caribs: 
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“The Caribs ate a ritual morsel”, I said, “on the eve of battle. You Jonah 
know how important such ritual is to disguise bitter self-knowledge or to 
bring it to light when our enemies – whom we would eat – bite into our own 
flesh. And now that we are on the eve of the holocaust, bitter and bitten alike, 
priest and victim alike, time has become invaluable.” (Harris, Jonestown 16) 
 
Throughout Jonestown Harris stresses the importance of transcending the binaries of 
self and other, recognizing the partial, composite and shared nature of being. Where 
Jones fails to bring seeming oppositions into relation – offering a “brand of religion [ 
... ] split between the dead past (so-called) and the future (so-called), Jones’s 
irredeemable universe, can prove a killing dogma, a killing manifesto directed at the 
heart of originality” (112) – Bone, despite his founding role in the cult, embraces the 
transformative capacity of his trauma; the potentiality that from the violence of war 
and terror, a creative impulse and original future may be borne. 
 Such, Deleuze argues in Nietzsche, is the very definition of the will-to-power. 
If, as noted above, a dialectical method problematically repeats the imperialist aim of 
the management of difference, here we find a further aspect of Deleuze’s critique of 
Hegelianism: its fundamentally negative movement. What drives dialectical 
transformation is the pairing of opposed forces and, as such, Deleuze argues, 
“everything depends on the role of the negative” (Nietzsche 8). A body or state of 
affairs is thus defined as a reactive force: it is “an exhausted force which does not 
have the strength to affirm its difference, a force which no longer acts but rather reacts 
to the forces which dominate it”; “the speculation of the pleb, [ ... ] the way of 
thinking of the slave” (9). Importantly, Hegel’s master-slave relationship is revised by 
Nietzsche who argues that both slave and master may be characterized as dominated 
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by reactive forces since each is defined by their relation to the other. Active and 
reactive forces are distinguished from one another, then, by the characteristic of their 
relation to other forces: the active force that simply is in itself  (differing, in the first 
instance, with what it is) and which will appropriate the forces with which it comes 
into contact in a process of transformation and self-enrichment; and the forces that are 
defined through a reactive moment of external recognition (that differ, first, from all 
that it is not).2 The will-to-dominate, therefore, is the will to have one’s power 
recognized: a reactive state characterized as an expression of ressentiment or bad 
conscience. Harris’s Jonah Jones displays an “imperial hubris” (Harris, Jonestown 50) 
and “perverse longing for glory” (52); his desire to create a multi-ethnic utopia turns 
into an absolutism in which he sees himself pitted against law and state. Thus, Harris 
exposes Jones’s reactive will-to-dominate. Yet, by contrast, Bone transgresses the 
binaries of victim and victor, self and other. The “structuralization of feud” (Harris, 
Explorations 132; emphasis original), or reactive framework (by which each side is 
determined by a negative opposition to the external other) is rejected by a character 
who embraces the power of transformation, creation and difference-in-itself: an active 
force that does not depend on external recognition or dialectical negation in order to 
simply be. In other words, between Jones and Bone, we move from the Nietzschean 
will-to-dominate to the will-to-power.3 
The distinction between active and reactive forces, the will-to-power and the 
will-to-dominate, reflects Harris’s sense of an immanent rather than transcendent 
ontology insofar as Nietzschean philosophy shows us that “it is important to see that 
forces enter into relations with other forces. Life struggles with another kind of life” 
(Deleuze Nietzsche 8; emphasis original). In other words, this model does not imply a 
transcendent or a priori absolute, but simply posits a relational whole in which life 
 13 
relates to another life of the same nature. The distinction to be drawn here depends 
upon the character of the relation: active or reactive. The impulse to destroy or 
dominate another force is a sign of ressentiment, a reactive power: 
 
I felt it was useless running from the Predator any longer. My desire had 
been to destroy him by hook or by crook. So much so that unconsciously, 
subconsciously, I was driven to contemplate poisoning the air everywhere 
that he breathed, the seas and oceans and lakes and rivers in which he swam, 
the environments and places that clothed him. “Kill him even if it means 
killing yourself,” Carnival Lord Death had said to me. [ ... ]  
 But the huntsman in the footfall of the Predator – close on the heels of 
the Predator – possessed a different tune. 
“Leap,” he said [ … ]  “into my net and help me to hold the heart of the 
Predator at bay within rhythms of profoundest self-confessional, self-
judgemental creativity.” (Harris, Jonestown 75) 
 
Here the desire to destroy the Predator is self-defeating: to poison the air that one 
breathes out of spite repeats the destructive will of the Predator and leads only to 
death. The huntsman, like the Nietzschean Übermensch, does not claim the will-to-
dominate but the power of creativity associated with the will-to-power. He neither 
judges nor condemns the other, but draws from the relation a capacity for self-
judgement, self-evaluation: “Critique is not a re-action of re-sentiment but the active 
expression of an active mode of existence; attack and not revenge” (Deleuze, 
Nietzsche 3). The active force evaluates those other forces with which it comes into 
contact, “sensing whether they agree or disagree with us, that is, whether they bring 
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forces to us” (Deleuze, Essays 135). In turn, what Harris terms “self-judgement” 
represents a creative and active process of self-evaluation and enrichment in relation 
to the forces that one encounters. 
 Deleuze expands upon this distinction between attack and revenge in his 
concepts of combat-between and combat-against: 
 
combat-against tries to destroy or repel a force [ ... ], but the combat-
between, by contrast, tries to take hold of a force in order to make it one’s 
own. The combat-between is the process through which a force enriches 
itself by seizing hold of other forces and joining itself to them in a new 
ensemble: a becoming. (Essays 132) 
 
This echoes precisely the Nietzschean distinction between active and reactive forces: 
combat-against operates through the will-to-dominate; combat-between is an active 
process which expresses the power of transformation and creation, “seizing hold of 
other forces” and creating “a new ensemble”. In resisting the temptation to destroy the 
Predator, Bones, unlike Jones, follows “a different tune”, “take[s] hold of a force in 
order to make it [his] own” and resists falling into ressentiment through the 
transformative will-to-power.  
 Harris’s implicit understanding of the distinct processes of combat-against and 
combat-between enables him to redress seeming absolutes as partial forces that 
encounter other forces in a creative self-evaluation. His rereading of the myth of 
Orpheus and Eurydice, for example, demonstrates how profoundly this model 
challenges commonly held convictions: 
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Let us recall that, in an ancient epic, Eurydice – the wife of the music-player 
Orpheus – is plucked away from him by Death, the Lord of the Under World. 
Orpheus is given a chance, it seems, to recover Eurydice but disobeys a 
command not to look back [ ... ]. Orpheus disobeys a command. Intuitively, 
subconsciously [ ... ] he glimmeringly perceived, when he looked back, that 
Eurydice would remain a pawn of the Under World if her apparent release 
had been sanctioned or sealed by Lord Death himself or itself. Something 
more radical and disturbing within death-dealing and conquistadorial regimes 
was gestating within layers of the unconscious. (Harris, Essays 190; 
emphasis original) 
 
Orpheus disobeys the command of Lord Death; he refuses to become a “slave” (in the 
Nietzschean sense) to the underworld. In the same vein, Harris recognizes that if 
Eurydice escaped under terms dictated by Death then, although she may leave the 
underworld, she remains captive to Death’s will. Such is the paradox of combat-
against that, in a different context, Wole Soyinka recognized when he argued that 
negritude would never offer a means to escape an imperialist mindset as long as it 
continued to seek the defeat of the other.4 In his struggle against Death, Orpheus can 
neither accept the terms dictated by the other nor repeat the imperialist aim of Death 
by seeking his destruction: “uncommon sense surely tells us that to stress conquest is 
to succumb to the very monster we fear” (Harris, Essays 191; emphasis original). 
Harris demands a “more radical” move than that. The myth must remain open to the 
potential to be re-read anew, appropriated in a transformative genesis of the 
imagination to uncover “new dimensions” (191). 
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 The distinction between the reactive will-to-dominate and creative will-to-
power also feeds into Harris’s comments on the capacity for self-judgement in 
Jonestown. In his conversation with Mr Mageye, Bone muses on the concepts of 
justice and freedom: “Kingship witnesses to the agonizing problematic of freedom, 
the gift of freedom to ourselves within ourselves and yet bestowed upon us by some 
incalculable design in heaven and upon earth” (Jonestown 54). The king or God “is 
held as a guarantee” (54): the transcendent or a priori source of freedom and justice, 
the highest judge to which we may appeal. In the example of Orpheus and Eurydice, 
discussed above, Lord Death remains the guarantor of Eurydice’s “freedom”, but as 
such she remains trapped within Death’s regime, determined by his terms. Once again 
this touches upon the distinction that Deleuze draws between active and reactive 
forces. “Men”, writes Deleuze, “judge insofar as they value their own lots, and are 
judged insofar as a form either confirms or dismisses their claim” (Deleuze, Essays 
129); or, for Harris:  
 
To be just [ ... ] was to serve one’s vested interest absolutely, whether 
pleasure or profit, to sublimate or suppress or eclipse one’s wounds in favour 
of strengthening a wall between oneself and the inferno that rules elsewhere [ 
… ].  
 Injustice, on the other hand, bore on a coming abreast of wounds one 
has suffered in the past through which one knows the pain in oneself and 
others, pain of mind that revives the Soul of Compassion beyond all 
machineries of the law of Death or of the state of embalmed institutions. 
(Harris, Jonestown 72) 
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To judge or seek justice presupposes an act of evaluation dependent on a transcendent 
or a priori ideal against which an act or thing may be measured: a critique conceived 
of as a reaction to external or higher guarantee. 
 Judgement is presented as the antithesis to the transformational life of Bone. 
Instead, Harris links the regenerative vision of his novel to the ability to transform 
one’s wounds. As Said suggests, the promise of postcolonial literatures resides in this 
“coming abreast of wounds one has suffered”, the resignifying of the colonial past in 
the “scars of humiliating wounds, as instigation for different practices, as potentially 
revised visions of the past tending towards a new future” (Said 34–35). Of course, 
from the outset of Jonestown, this is precisely the project of Bone’s Dream-Book in 
which he relates the tragedy: “I needed to revisit the scene and the entire environment 
[ … ] , by retracing my steps, by accepting my wounds and lameness and the speed of 
light with which one travels back into the past from bleak futures” (170; emphasis 
added). To deny, “sublimate or eclipse” one’s wounds is to succumb to ressentiment; 
to accept one’s wounds, “embracing the event and the transformations it induces – not 
its brute actuality” (Reynolds 153), is amor fati and a will-to-power.  
To understand why the events that wound us retain a transformative capacity 
returns us to the beginning of this essay where I outlined Deleuze’s concept of 
different/ciation as the becoming-actual of the virtual and creation of the new. The 
virtual-actual pairing is key to Deleuze’s ontology. However, to his philosophy of 
time he adds another, parallel, dualism: Aion and Chronos: “Chronos is the present 
which alone exists. It makes of the past and future its two oriented directions, so that 
one goes always from the past to the future [ ... ] Aion is the past-future” (Deleuze, 
Logic 89). Chronos is linear, sequential time and belongs to the realm of the actual; 
Aion is a pure, virtual plane. Thus, recalling the process of different/ciation, for 
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Deleuze any event occurs both within “actual”, linear time and persists as a pure or 
virtual form: “What History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of affairs or 
in lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its 
self-positing as a concept, escapes History” (Deleuze and Guattari 110). In other 
words, what history recalls of the event is its “brute actuality” in linear time. By the 
same token, the counter-actualization of the event returns us to its “specific 
consistency” on the virtual plane of composition: the pure difference that escapes 
history. 
 The revisionary impulse of Bone’s Dream-Book, therefore, has philosophical 
resonance exceeding what Louis Simon characterizes as a “move beyond the horror 
and incomprehensibility of the journalistic record of the Jonestown massacre” (211). 
Simon is right to identify this process as a revisionary engagement both with the 
recorded past and with memory, however, to simplistically label the latter as a “non-
Western conception” (213) ignores the important parallels Harris’s work holds with 
that of philosophers such as Deleuze and Henri Bergson, who explore the creative 
potential of a virtual or pure concept of the past. Furthermore, Deleuze’s account 
reminds us that it is never simply a question of revisiting the memory of an individual, 
but the return to or counter-actualization of a shared plane of immanence. As Bone 
claims in his opening “letter to WH”, “I drifted into what seemed an abnormal 
lucidity upon chasms of time [ ... ]. One becomes, it seems, a vessel of composite 
epic, imbued with many voices, one is a multitude” (5). What Harris refers to as 
Memory Theatre, then, evokes a shared but only partially grasped past that may be 
rehearsed anew. At the same time, by reading this through a Deleuzian lens – 
specifically through his pairing of Aion and Chronos as the two, irreducible but 
coexistent temporalities – one gains a sense both of the virtual potential of the past to 
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become-new and a common-sense linear sequence of time. To argue, as Paula Burnett 
has, that Harris wholly rejects teleology and a diachronic conception of time, unfixing 
“the locatedness of the past, such as 1978 in Jonestown”, freeing it “from its fixedness 
so that it can signify afresh in the now or the future” (Burnett 221), glosses over the 
specificity of Jonestown. Historical markers, such as the date of the Jonestown 
massacre, 18 November 1978, or the night that Bone’s mother was murdered, 24 
March 1939 (cf. 35), are very precisely located in the text. In other words, while the 
revisionary potential for Memory Theatre lies in the counter-actualization of events in 
linear, historical time – returning to a pure, virtual temporality – this should not be 
mistaken as the outright rejection of any possibility of a linear concept of time. To 
avoid the chaotic, formless plane of immanence that Whitehead cautions against while 
retaining the revisionary potential of the Deleuzian virtual, both Aion and Chronos 
are necessary actors in postcolonial Memory Theatre.  
 Furthermore, in Bignall’s characterization of postcolonial critique as both “the 
disruption and ‘counter-actualisation’ of the problematic post-colonial present [ … ] , 
and the subsequent reconstruction of an alternative postcolonial present” (114; 
emphasis original), it is precisely by means of the Aion-Chronos pairing that she 
constructs her method. In order to create an alternative present, one first counter-
actualizes the wounding event, returning to the virtual plane of composition, and then 
re-actualizes a new present/future (according to the logic of different/ciation as the 
eternal return of difference). By reliving the Jonestown tragedy, Bone counter-
actualizes the trauma that wounds him. But far from falling into ressentiment, he lives 
creatively out of the wounding event by imagining an alternative present-future: 
“Continuities running out of the mystery of the past into the unknown future yield 
proportions of originality, proportions of the ‘genuinely new’” (Jonestown 6). 
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Creation, the ability to counter-actualize the events that wound us and construct an 
alternative future freed from the oppositional or imperialist ideologies that limit us, as 
Harris and Said implicitly recognize, marks the active force, will-to-power and 
combat-between of a properly postcolonial consciousness.  
 Harris’s own philosophy of time, then, incorporates the two coexistent 
temporalities of Aion and Chronos while celebrating the creative force of 
different/ciation as the potential of a postcolonial present/future freed from “imperial 
hubris” (50). Indeed, Jonestown has inspired a number of different interpretations of 
Harris’s philosophy of time – for example, the work of Paula Burnett, Carmen 
Concilio, Louis Simon and Stephanos Stephanides. The latter joins critics such as 
Andrew Benjamin, C. L. R. James and Gregory Shaw who explore the links between 
Harris’s work and various continental philsophers.5 In Stephanides’s reading of 
Jonestown, a number of the concepts discussed in this essay – becoming, the rejection 
of final unity, and the theorization of two temporalities – are explored in relation to 
the philosophy of Walter Benjamin, most notably his theory of language and 
messianic concept of time. Significantly, while deconstruction emphasizes the 
différance of translation, in Benjamin’s hands the question of translatability is 
specifically linked to his philosophical account of history. For Benjamin, Stephanides 
argues: 
 
The possibility of pure language ensues from the language being always 
already displaced from a utopian original unity or wholeness, and this 
possibility may be fulfilled in “God’s remembrance” [ ... ]. The gesture to 
salvage comes after the Fall [ ... ]. The fall of language and the impulse to 
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salvage is not simply a nostalgia for origins but an attempt that “we might 
salvage a future from the ruins of the past”. (235) 
 
Here the familiar trait of regeneration in the face of trauma and disaster, so apparent 
from the outset of Jonestown, is given additional resonance as Stephanides links it to 
Benjamin’s famous account of the angel of history. Yet while Benjamin’s philosophy 
of history does depart from a strictly Hegelian sense of dialectical process, stresses 
becoming over stasis – offering an “always deferred” teleology (Stephanides 236) – 
and moves “from mimesis or equivalence to difference in translation” (236), when 
viewed from a Deleuzian perspective, one uncovers the limitations of Benjamin’s 
philosophy of history for a properly postcolonial vision of the past. 
Contrasting Benjaminian and Deleuzian philosophies, Laura Penny argues that 
although “Benjamin and Deleuze and Guattari all underline the link between 
creativity and futurity, or becoming [ ... ] they ultimately conceive of this immanence 
differently” (n. pag.). And it is precisely the difference between these two positions, 
and, more specifically, how these different philosophers address the concept of 
judgement, that is, I argue, crucial when evaluating their significance for Harris. As 
Penny argues:  
 
The most significant difference between these two thinkers is that Benjamin 
maintains an admittedly idiosyncratic theological framework that Deleuze 
explicitly criticises and rejects. Benjamin’s theologically-inflected theory of 
language, and his messianic notion of history for the dead, act as 
supplements to criticism, insofar as they take up the work of judgement, and 
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refer it to a higher power, to the distant and improbable union that reconciles 
and redeems all. (n. pag.) 
 
In other words, the Benjaminian reading of language, messianic time and critique 
ultimately depends on a transcendent, higher power as guarantee; a deferred and 
displaced, but nevertheless assumed, absolute source of judgement and justice.  
 As signalled above, Deleuze wrests judgement and critique away from a priori 
or transcendent foundations precisely because they forestall the potential for creation, 
originality and newness. As Deleuze argues: 
 
judgement [ … ]  presupposes preexisting criteria (higher values), criteria 
that preexist for all time (to the infinity of time), so that it can neither 
apprehend what is new in an existing being, nor even sense the creation of a 
mode of existence [ … ]. Judgement prevents the emergence of any new 
mode of existence. For the latter creates itself through its own forces, that is, 
through the forces it is able to harness, and is valid in and of itself inasmuch 
as it brings the new combination into existence. (Deleuze, Essays 134–35) 
 
To judge is to depend on the knowledge that an external or transcendent measure 
exists against which something may be judged: a (Platonic) transcendence at the heart 
of immanence and sign of a reactive will-to-dominate. Furthermore, since judgement 
depends on “preexisting criteria [ … ] that preexist for all time” it cannot offer a basis 
for the production of genuine originality. It fails precisely on the same grounds as the 
Hegelian dialectic: “reality is not ‘created’ but ‘realised’ in this process, in the sense 
that everything that comes to be always already exists, or is pre-given, and is simply 
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‘made real’” (Bignall 34). Genuine newness or creation cannot be judged from 
predetermined standards or norms; it does not react but rather creates its own lines of 
(immanent) becoming: “It is not a question of judging other existing beings, but of 
sensing whether they agree or disagree with us, that is whether they bring forces to 
us” (Deleuze, Essays 135). Living creatively out of the wounding event, evaluating 
forces and how they might enrich us, this is the will-to-power and the expression of an 
active mode of existence free from ressentiment.  
 As Jonestown moves towards its conclusion, Bone comes face to face with his 
own judges. He finds himself mistaken for Deacon by the judges who refuse to 
recognize the partial existence or cross-cultural masks that Bone wears: “Deacon’s 
judges which would then become my judges in the altered textuality of the Play” 
(Harris, Jonestown 224; emphasis original). Determined to hold Deacon to account 
for stealing the fortune of Roraima, the judges pass sentence on Bone: 
 
I was a mere Colonial. Not an Imperialist [ ... ]. Are Colonials the only 
potential creators of the genius of Memory theatre? I was weak, but I had 
gained the other side of the Dream. 
    “Who then are we to judge?” 
    “Judge me,” I said at last. “I am here before you. I have nothing. I am 
poor. Judge me. It is no accident.” 
     They took me without further ado to the edge of the cliff [ ... ]. It fell with 
me, the Predator fell with me, when their hands, the judges’ hands, drove me 
over the edge of the cliff [ … ] . The Predator peered through me, in me, but 
was held at bay in the net. We stood face to face, Dread and I, Predator and I. 
Old age and youth parted and I was naked in the lighted Darkness of the Self 
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[ … ]. Lightness becomes a new burden upon the extremities of galaxies in 
which humanity sees itself attuned to the sources and origins of every 
memorial star that takes it closer and closer – however far removed – to the 
unfathomable body of the Creator. (233–44) 
 
As in Harris’s rereading of Orpheus and Eurydice, Bone’s redemption cannot be 
conceived within the framework of judgement and punishment. Sentenced to death, 
Bone does not escape his fate by, like Eurydice, fleeing death. Salvation and 
repentance, rather, “take us beyond the framed and flat world into the Virgin-
archetype and the rhetoric of intercourse with reality shorn of violence” (227). The 
judges who pass sentence seek reparation and justice for the crime committed against 
them by Deacon: an attempt to “sublimate or suppress or eclipse” their wounds (72) 
by recourse to a measure of judgement dependent on absolute values such as life and 
death, law and anarchy, self and other. To this Harris contrasts “injustice”, “a coming 
abreast of wounds one has suffered in the past through which one knows the pain in 
oneself and others” and “the Soul of Compassion beyond all machineries of the law of 
Death or of the state of embalmed institutions” (72).  
 In this closing paragraph, Bone moves “beyond” all frames and evokes 
something of the vitalistic force (“the unfathomable body of the Creator”) that may be 
traced back to Harris’s earliest novels. What is key to unravelling the Dream-book of 
Bone’s trauma is the contrast that Harris establishes between active and reactive 
forces. To judge, to rule with the absolutism of Jones, to seek to erase or sublimate the 
past: these acts fall on the side of the will-to-dominate. The redemptive vision that 
Bone seeks on the other hand is realized through an active engagement with the forces 
that he encounters: living creatively out of the wounding event. More crucially, by 
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means of a dialogue with the philosophy of Deleuze, this active mode of existence 
may not only be linked to the concepts of judgement, immanence and counter-
actualization (key, as Bignall argues, to postcolonial critique), but can be seen to feed 
into a philosophy of time that maintains both our experience of linear Chronos and 
sense of the radical potentiality of the future to become new in Aion. Harris, like 
Deleuze, may stress the importance of the latter, but both are essential components in 




1. For a detailed commentary on this shift see Mullarkey.   
2. This paraphrases Deleuze: “in Bergson [...] the thing differs with itself first, 
immediately. According to Hegel, the thing differs with itself because it differs first 
with all that it is not” (in Hardt 7; emphasis original).  
3. For commentary on the importance of this distinction for postcolonial thought, see 
Burns (113–6). 
4. Soyinka’s argument that negritude trapped “itself in what was primarily a defensive 
role” (129) and “stayed within a pre-set system of Eurocentric intellectual analysis” 
(136), highlights this point: counter-colonial discourse is trapped within a “pre-set 
system” in which the black man is cast as other. 
5. James discusses Harris in light of Heidegger (157–72); Shaw cites Hegel as a more 
significant influence (141–51). Andrew Benjamin draws on Nietzsche to explore the 
relevance of repetition rather than dialectical negation in The Eye of the Scarecrow. 
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